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Abstract— Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium,
wireless communication is susceptible to adversarial eavesdrop-
ping. This paper describes how eavesdropping can potentially be
defeated by exploiting the superposition nature of the wireless
medium. A Gaussian wire-tap channel with a helping interferer
(WTC-HI) is considered in which a transmitter sends confi-
dential messages to its intended receiver in the presence of a
passive eavesdropper and with the help of an interferer. The
interferer, which does not know the confidential message assists
the confidential message transmission by sending a signal that is
independent of the transmitted message. An achievable secrecy
rate and a Sato-type upper bound on the secrecy capacity are
given for the Gaussian WTC-HI. Through numerical analysis, it
is found that the upper bound is close to the achievable secrecy
rate when the interference is weak for symmetric interference
channels, and under more general conditions for asymmetric
Gaussian interference channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast and superposition are two fundamental properties
of the wireless medium. Due to the broadcast nature, wireless
transmission can be heard by multiple receivers with possibly
different signal strengths. Due to the superposition nature, a
receiver observes a signal that is a superposition of multiple
simultaneous transmissions. From the secure communication
point of view, the two properties are interwoven and pose
a number of security issues. In particular, the broadcast na-
ture makes wireless transmission susceptible to eavesdropping
since anyone within the communication range can listen and
possibly extract information. A helper can pit one property
of the wireless medium against security issues caused by the
other. In this paper, we consider the case in which a helper
functions as an interferer to improve the secrecy level of
a communication session that is compromised by a passive
eavesdropper. This phenomenon illustrates that superposition
can enhance security.
As depicted in Fig. 1, we study the problem in which a
transmitter sends confidential messages to an intended receiver
with the help of an interferer, in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper. We call this model the wiretap channel with
a helping interferer (WTC-HI). Here, it is desirable to min-
imize the leakage of information to the eavesdropper. The
secrecy level, i.e., the level of ignorance of the eavesdropper
with respect to the confidential message, is measured by the
equivocation rate. This information-theoretic approach was
introduced by Wyner [1] for the wiretap channel problem,
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Fig. 1. A Gaussian wiretap channel with a helping interferer.
in which a single source-destination communication is eaves-
dropped upon via a degraded channel. Wyner’s formulation
was generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner who determined the
capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential
messages [2]. The Gaussian wiretap channel was considered
in [3]. The central idea is that the transmitter uses stochastic
encoding [2] to introduce randomness, and hence increase
secrecy. In the WTC-HI model, the helper provides additional
randomization via stochastic encoding without knowing the
transmitted message.
In this paper, we give an achievable secrecy rate for the
Gaussian WTC-HI under the requirement that the eavesdrop-
per is kept in total ignorance with respect to the message
for the intended receiver. The results show that the interferer
can indeed increase the secrecy level, and that a positive
secrecy rate can be achieved even when the source-destination
channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper channel. We
also describe a power control strategy for maximizing the
achievable secrecy rate. In addition, we provide a Sato-type
upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WTC-
HI. Through numerical analysis, we find that the upper bound
is close to the achievable secrecy rate when the interference
is weak for symmetric interference channels, and under more
general conditions for asymmetric Gaussian WTC-HIs.
Related work includes the multiple access channel with
confidential messages [4]–[7], the interference channel with
confidential messages [8], [9], and the relay channel with
confidential messages [10]–[12]. Our achievable scheme can
be considered to be a generalization of the two schemes of
[6] and [11]. The cooperative jamming scheme of [6] con-
siders the situation in which encoder 2 generates independent
Gaussian noise. This scheme does not employ any structure in
the transmitted signal. The noise forwarding scheme of [11]
requires that the interferer’s codewords can always be decoded
by the intended receiver which is not necessary in our scheme.
In addition, no work describes a computable upper bound on
the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WTC-HI.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the system model and problem formulation.
Section III states our achievability results. Section IV gives
the upper bound. Section V illustrate the results through some
numerical examples. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system consists of a transmitter, an intended receiver, a
helping interferer, and a passive eavesdropper. The transmitter
sends a confidential message W to the intended receiver with
the help from an independent interferer, in the presence of
passive but intelligent eavesdropper (who knows both code-
books). As illustrated in Fig. 1, the channel outputs at the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper can be written as
Y1,k = X1,k +
√
bX2,k + Z1,k, (1a)
Y2,k =
√
aX1,k +X2,k + Z2,k, (1b)
for k = 1, . . . , n, where {Z1,k} and {Z2,k} are sequences
of independent and identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian
noise variables with unit variances. The channel inputs X1,k
and X2,k satisfy average block power constraints of the form
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[X21,k] ≤ P¯1 and
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[X22,k] ≤ P¯2. (2)
The transmitter uses encoder 1 to encode confidential mes-
sage w ∈ W = {1, . . . ,M} into xn and sends it to the
intended receiver in n channel uses. A stochastic encoder f1 is
specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities f1(x1,k|w),
where x1,k ∈ X , w ∈ W ,
∑
x1,k
f1(x1,k|w) = 1 for all
k = 1, . . . , n, and f1(x1,k|w) is the probability that encoder
1 outputs x1,k when message w is being sent. The helper
generates its output x2,k randomly and can be considered as
using another stochastic encoder f2, which is specified by a
matrix of conditional probabilities f2(x2,k) with x2,k ∈ X2
and
∑
x2,k
f2(x2,k) = 1. Hence, encoder 1 uses stochastic
encoding to introduce randomness and increase secrecy. Addi-
tional randomization is provided by the helper and the secrecy
is further increased.
The decoder uses the output sequence yn1 to compute its
estimate wˆ of w. The decoding function is specified by a
(deterministic) mapping φ : Yn1 →W .
An (M,n, Pe) code for the Gaussian WTC-HI consists of
two sets of n encoding functions f1,k and f2,k, k = 1, . . . , n
and a decoding function φ so that its average probability of
error is
Pe =
1
M
∑
w
Pr {φ(Y n1 ) 6= w|w sent} . (3)
The secrecy level (level of ignorance of the eavesdropper
with respect to the confidential message w) is measured by
the equivocation rate1 1
n
H(W |Y n2 ).
A secrecy rate Rs is achievable for the Gaussian WTC-HI
if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an (M,n, Pe) code so that
1The secrecy defined by equivocation rate is weak and can be strengthened
using extractor functions without loss of secrecy rate as shown in [13].
M ≥ 2nRs , Pe ≤ ǫ (4)
and Rs − 1
n
H(W |Y n2 ) ≤ ǫ (5)
for all sufficiently large n. The secrecy capacity is the maximal
achievable secrecy rate.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In this section, we consider an achievable secrecy rate by
assuming that the transmitter and the interferer transmit with
powers P1 ≤ P¯1 and P2 ≤ P¯2, respectively. We address the
power control issue in Subsection III-B.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Theorem 1: The following secrecy rate is achievable for the
Gaussian WTC-HI:
Rs(P1, P2) =


0 if a ≥ 1 + P2,
RIs(P1, P2) if 1 ≤ a < 1 + P2,
RIIs (P1, P2) if a < 1,
(6)
where RIs(P1, P2) and RIIs (P1, P2) are given by
RIs(P1, P2) =

g(P1)− g( aP11+P2 ) if b ≥ 1 + P1,[
g(P1 + bP2)− g(aP1 + P2)
]+ if 1 ≤ b < 1 + P1,[
g( P11+bP2 )− g(
aP1
1+P2
)
]+
if b < 1,
and
RIIs (P1, P2) =

g(P1)− g( aP11+P2 ) if b ≥ 1 + P1,
g(P1 + bP2)− g(aP1 + P2) if β1 ≤ b < 1 + P1,
g(P1)− g(aP1) if β2 ≤ b < β1,
g( P11+bP2 )− g( aP11+P2 ) if b < β2,
with g(x) , (1/2) log2(1 + x),
β1 =
1 + P1
1 + aP1
and β2 =
a(1 + P1)
1 + aP1 + (1 − a)P2 .
Proof: We briefly outline the achievability scheme next
and omit the details of the proof.
In the scheme, we use two independent Gaussian code-
books. Encoder 1 uses stochastic codebook C1(2nR1 , 2nRs , n),
where 2nR1 is the size of the codebook, and 2nRs is the
number of confidential messages can be conveyed (Rs ≤ R).
The 2nR1 codewords in codebook C1 are randomly grouped
into 2nRs bins each with M = 2n(R1−Rs) codewords. In
addition, encoder 2 uses codebook C2(2nR2 , 1, n), where 2nR2
is the codebook size and the whole codebook forms a single
bin. To send message w ∈ [1, . . . , 2nRs ], encoder 1 randomly
selects a codeword from the w-th bin to send, and encoder 2
randomly selects a codeword from codebook C2 to send.
The achievable rate given in Theorem 1 is derived by using
the above coding scheme and properly choosing the coding
parameter triple (R1, Rs, R2).
Remark 1: It is clear that an interference power P2 can
benefit secrecy. In particular, when P2 is sufficiently large,
a positive secrecy rate can be achieved except the case
a−1 ≤ b < 1.
For comparison, we recall that the secrecy capacity of the
Gaussian wiretap channel (when there is no interferer in the
Gaussian WTC-HI model) is
RWTs = [g(P1)− g(aP1)]+ (7)
and positive secrecy rate can be achieved only when a < 1.
B. Power Control
Power control is essential to interference management when
accommodating multi-user communications. As for the Gaus-
sian WTC-HI, power control also plays a critical role. The
interferer may need to control its power so that it does not
introduce too much interference to the primary transmission,
while the transmitter may want to select its power so that
the intended receiver is able to decode and cancel some now
helpful interference before decoding the primary transmission.
In this section, we consider a power control strategy for
maximizing the secrecy rate given in Theorem 1. We consider
the cases with a ≥ 1 and a < 1, respectively. Due to space
limitations, we omit the proof.
1) a ≥ 1:
Proposition 1: When a ≥ 1, the power control scheme for
maximizing the secrecy rate is given by
(P1, P2) =


(min{P¯1, P ∗1 }, P¯2) if b > 1, P¯2 > a− 1,
(P¯1,min{P¯2, P ∗2 }) if b < 1a , P¯2 > a−11−ab ,
(0, 0) otherwise,
where P ∗1 = b− 1 and
P ∗2 =
a− 1 +
√
(a− 1)2 + (b−1 − a)[a− b+ (1− b)aP¯1]
1− ab .(8)
According to Proposition 1, when a > 1, a positive secrecy
rate can be achieved when b > 1 or b ≤ a−1 if the interferer’s
power P¯2 is large enough. When b > 1, the interferer uses its
full power P¯2 and the transmitter selects its power to guarantee
that the intended receiver can first decode the interference (and
cancel it). When b < a−1, the intended receiver treats the
interference as noise. In this case, the transmitter can use its
full power P¯1 and the interferer controls its power (below P ∗2 )
to avoid excessive interference.
2) a < 1:
Proposition 2: When a < 1, the power control scheme for
maximizing the secrecy rate is given by
(P1, P2) =

(P¯1, P¯2) if b ≥ 1, P¯1 < b− 1,
(P¯1, P¯2) if b ≥ 1a , P¯1 ≥ b− 1, P¯2 < 1−aab−1 ,
(P ∗1 , P¯2) if b ≥ 1a , P¯1 ≥ b− 1, P¯2 ≥ 1−aab−1 ,
(P¯1, P¯2) if 1 ≤ b < 1a , b− 1 ≤ P¯1 < b−11−ab ,
(P¯1,min{P¯2, P ∗2 }) if b < 1, P¯1 ≥ b−aa(1−b) ,
(P¯1, 0) otherwise,
where P ∗1 = b− 1 and P ∗2 is given by (8).
When a < 1, positive secrecy rate is always feasible. Here,
we consider the cases when the interferer does not help. First,
in the case when 1 ≤ b < a−1, the transmitter needs to hold its
power if it wants to let the receiver decode some interference.
However, if the transmitter has a large power (P¯1 > b−11−ab ),
it would better to use all its power and request the interferer
be silent. In the case when a < b < 1, the receiver treats the
interference as noise. If the transmitter does not have enough
power (P¯1 < b−aa(1−b) ), the interference will hurt the intended
receiver more than the eavesdropper.
C. Power-unconstrained Secrecy Rate
A fundamental parameter of wiretap-channel-based wireless
secrecy systems is the secrecy rate when the transmitter has
unconstrained power, which is only related to the channel
conditions. For example, the power-unconstrained secrecy
capacity for the Gaussian wiretap channel is given by
lim
P¯1→∞
[
g(P¯1)− g(aP¯1)
]+
=
1
2
[
log2
1
a
]+
. (9)
After some limiting analysis, we have the following result for
the Gaussian WTC-HI model.
Theorem 2: When a ≥ 1, the achievable power uncon-
strained secrecy rate for the Gaussian WTC-HI is
lim
P¯1,P¯2→∞
Rs =


1
2 log2 b if b > 1,
1
2 log2
1
ab
if b < 1
a
,
0 otherwise.
(10)
When a < 1, the achievable power unconstrained secrecy rate
for the Gaussian WTC-HI is
lim
P¯1,P¯2→∞
Rs =


1
2 log2 b if b >
1
a
,
1
2 log2
1
ab
if b < 1,
1
2 log2
1
a
otherwise.
(11)
When the interference is weak (b < a−1 if a ≥ 1, or b < 1 if
a < 1), the interference introduces a gain of (1/2) log2(1/b).
When the interference is strong enough (b > 1 if a ≥ 1, or
b > a−1 if a < 1), the power-unconstrained secrecy rate is
(1/2) log2 b. Note that (1/2) log2 b is the power-unconstrained
secrecy rate if the confidential message is sent from the
interferer to the intended receiver in the presence of the
eavesdropper. This is particularly interesting because we do
not assume that there is a transmitter-interferer channel (which
would enable the interferer to relay the transmission).
IV. SATO-TYPE UPPER BOUND
In this section, we first describe a computable Sato-type
upper bound for a general WTC-HI and next evaluate the upper
bound for the Gaussian WTC-HI.
It should be noted that the secrecy capacity of the WTC-
HI depends only on the marginal distributions PY1|X1,X2 and
PY2|X1,X2 , and not on any further structure of the joint distri-
bution PY1,Y2|X1,X2 . In fact, the secrecy capacity is the same
for any channel described by PY˜1,Y˜2|X1,X2 whose marginal
distributions satisfy
PY˜j |X1,X2(yj |x1, x2) = PYj |X1,X2(yj |x1, x2) (12)
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Fig. 2. Achievable secrecy rate and upper bound versus channel gain a = b
for a symmetric channel.
for j = 1, 2 and all y1, y2 and x1, x2.
Theorem 3: Let Ru denote a Sato-type upper bound
Ru , min
PY˜1,Y˜2|X1,X2
max
PX1 ,PX2
I(X1, X2; Y˜1|Y˜2). (13)
Then, the secrecy capacity of WTC-HI satisfies
Rs ≤ min
[
Ru, max
PX1 ,PX2
I(X1;Y1|X2)
]
. (14)
Proof: The proof can be found in the Appendix.
The upper bound assumes that a genie gives the eavesdrop-
per’s signal Y˜2 to the intended receiver as the side information
for decoding message W . Since the eavesdropper’s signal Y˜2
is always a degraded version of the combined signal (Y˜1, Y˜2),
the wiretap channel result [1] can therefore be used.
Now we consider the evaluate of (13) for the Gaussian
WTC-HI. I(X1, X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) is a function of the transmit power
P1, P2 and the noise covariance ρ. Hence, it is denoted as
f(P1, P2, ρ) and is shown to be
f(P1, P2, ρ) =
1
2
×
log2
(1 + P1 + bP2)(1 + aP1 + P2)− (ρ+
√
aP1 +
√
bP2)
2
(1− ρ2)(1 + aP1 + P2) .
(15)
For any given ρ, f(P1, P2, ρ) is an increasing function of
both P1 and P2. For any given P1 and P2, f(P1, P2, ρ) is
a convex function of ρ and the minimum occurs when ρ is
chosen to be ρ⋆, which is given by
ρ⋆(P1, P2) =
(1 + a)P1 + (1 + b)P2 + (
√
ab− 1)2P1P2 −
√
∆
2(
√
aP1 +
√
bP2)
where
∆ = [(
√
a− 1)2P1 + (
√
b− 1)2P2 + (
√
ab− 1)2P1P2]
× [(√a+ 1)2P1 + (
√
b+ 1)2P2 + (
√
ab− 1)2P1P2].
Therefore, the Sato-type upper bound can be calculated as
Ru = min
ρ
max
(P1,P2)
f(P1, P2, ρ) = f(P¯1, P¯2, ρ
∗(P¯1, P¯2)).
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Fig. 3. Achievable secrecy rate and upper bound versus b.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Fig. 2 shows the achievable rate and the modified Sato-
type upper bound for a symmetric Gaussian WTC-HI channel
(a = b). In this example, we assume that P¯1 = P¯2 = 2, and
a varies from 0 to 4. The achievable rate Rs first decreases
with a when a < 1; when 1 < a ≤ 1.73, Rs increases with
a because the intended receiver now can decode and cancel
the interference, while the eavesdropper can only treat the
interference as noise; when a > 1.73, Rs decreases again with
a because the interference does not affect the eavesdropper
much when a is large. The upper bound is good for the weak
interference case when a ≤ 1. However, when a > 1 and
a is large, the upper bound is quite loose because too much
information is given to the intended receiver in the genie-aided
bound.
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we present numerical results to show
the achievable rate and the modified Sato-type upper bound
for the general parameter settings of a and b, where we again
assume that P¯1 = P¯2 = 2. In Fig. 3, we show the secrecy
rate versus b when a is fixed to be 0.6 and 1.2, respectively.
In Fig. 4, we show the secrecy rate versus a when b is fixed
to be 0.2 and 1.2, respectively. Our numerical results show
that the Sato-type upper bound is good when ab ≤ 1 (which
is consistent with a ≤ 1 for the symmetric case). Note that
ab = 1 corresponds to the degraded case, for which the Sato-
type upper bound is always tight.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the use of the super-
position property of the wireless medium to alleviate the
eavesdropping issues caused by the broadcast nature of the
medium. We have studied a Gaussian wiretap channel with
a helping interferer, in which the interferer assists the secret
communication by injecting independent interference. We have
given an achievable secrecy rate and a Sato-type upper bound
on the secrecy capacity. The results show that interference,
which seldom offers any advantage for (Gaussian) problems
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy rate and upper bound versus a.
not involving secrecy, can benefit secret wireless communica-
tion.
APPENDIX
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 3]
The secrecy requirement implies that
nRs = H(W ) ≤ H(W |Y n2 ) + nǫ, (16)
and Fano’s inequality implies that
H(W |Y n1 ) ≤ nǫR1 + h(ǫ) , nδ. (17)
Based on (16) and (17), we have
nRs ≤ H(W |Y n2 ) + nǫ
≤ H(W |Y n2 )−H(W |Y n1 ) + n(ǫ+ δ)
≤ H(W |Y n2 )−H(W |Y n1 , Y n2 ) + n(ǫ+ δ) (18)
= I(W ;Y n1 |Y n2 ) + n(ǫ + δ)
≤ I(Xn1 , Xn2 ;Y n1 |Y n2 ) + n(ǫ+ δ) (19)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i;Y1,i|Y2,i) + n(ǫ+ δ), (20)
where (18) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy,
and (19) follows since W → (Xn1 , Xn2 ) → (Y n1 , Y n2 ) forms
a Markov chain. Since the secrecy capacity of the WTC-
HI depends only on marginal distributions, we can replace
(Y1, Y2) with (Y˜1, Y˜2) defined by (12) and obtain (13).
Now we evaluate (13) for the Gaussian WTC-HI. We let
Y˜1 = X1 +
√
bX2 + Z˜1 and Y˜2 =
√
aX1 +X2 + Z˜2, (21)
where Z˜1 and Z˜2 are arbitrarily correlated Gaussian random
variables with zero-means and unit variances. Let ρ denote the
covariance between Z˜1 and Z˜2, i.e.,
Cov(Z˜1, Z˜2) = ρ.
Now, I(X1, X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) can be evaluated as
I(X1, X2; Y˜1|Y˜2)
= I(X1, X2; Y˜1, Y˜2)− I(X1, X2; Y˜2)
= [H(Y˜1, Y˜2)−H(Y˜1, Y˜2|X1, X2)]− [h(Y˜2)− h(Y˜2|X1, X2)]
= h(Y˜1|Y˜2)− h(Z˜1|Z˜2)
= h(Y˜1|Y˜2)− 1
2
log2[2πe(1− ρ2)]. (22)
By letting
t =
E[Y˜1Y˜2]
E[Y˜ 22 ]
, (23)
we have
h(Y˜1|Y˜2) = h(Y˜1 − tY˜2|Y˜2)
≤ h(Y˜1 − tY˜2) (24)
≤ 1
2
log2[2πeVar(Y˜1 − tY˜2)], (25)
where (25) follows from the maximum-entropy theorem and
both equalities in (24) and (25) hold true when (X1, X2) are
Gaussian.
Furthermore, we have
Var(Y˜1 − tY˜2) = 1 + P1 + bP2 − (ρ+
√
aP1 +
√
bP2)
2
1 + aP1 + P2
.
Hence, I(X1, X2; Y˜1|Y˜2) can be evaluated by (15).
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[2] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[3] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian wire-tap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, July
1978.
[4] Y. Liang and H. V. Poor, “Multiple access channels with confidential
messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 976–1002, Mar.
2008.
[5] R. Liu, I. Maric, R. Yates, and P. Spasojevic, “The discrete memoryless
multiple access channel with confidential messages,” in Proc. IEEE Int.
Symp. Information Theory, Seattle, WA, USA, July 2006.
[6] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The general Gaussian multiple-access and
two-way wire-tap channels: Achievable rates and cooperative jamming,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, Jun. 2008, to appear.
[7] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic, and H. V. Poor, “Multiple access channels
with generalized feedback and confidential messages,” in Proc. IEEE Inf.
Theory Workshop, Lake Tahoe, CA, USA, Sept. 2007.
[8] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojevic, and R. Yates, “Discrete memoryless
interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages: Secrecy
capacity regions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, Jun. 2008, to
appear.
[9] Y. Liang, A. Somekh-Baruch, H. V. Poor, S. Shamai, and S. Verdu,
“Cognitive interference channels with confidential messages,” in Proc.
45th Annual Allerton Conference on Commun. Contr. Computing,
Monticello, IL, USA, Sept. 2007.
[10] Y. Oohama, “Coding for relay channels with confidential messages,” in
IEEE Inf. Theory Workshop, Cairns, Australia, Sept. 2001, pp. 87–89.
[11] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The relay-eavesdropper channel: Cooperation
for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, Dec. 2006, submitted.
[12] M. Yuksel and E. Erkip, “The relay channel with a wire-tapper,” in
Proc. 41st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems,
Baltimore, MD, Mar. 2007.
[13] U. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Information-theoretic key agreement: From
weak to strong secrecy for free,” in EUROCRYPT, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 1807. Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 351–368.
